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SCHOOL DISCIPLINE AND THE HANDICAPPED CHILD
Over the past quarter-century American society has witnessed a
revolution in the treatment of the mentally and physically handicapped.
Historically the objects of fear, superstition, and segregation from the
mainstream of community life,2 handicapped citizens only recently have
begun to demand and receive the civil rights to which they are entitled.'
The American educational system mirrored society's insensitivity by
denying handicapped children schooling suited to their needs.4 Although
' See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment. The Qualifications of
Handicapped Persons As a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 855, 855 (1975) (handicapped have recently begun to receive civil rights)
[hereinafter cited as Burgdorf & BurgdorfJ. The Education For All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975 (EHA) defines handicapped children as those children suffering from mental
retardation, hearing, speech, or visual impairment, emotional disturbance, orthopedic
disability, or other physical or mental conditions requiring special treatment and education.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1976). Estimates of the number of handicapped children vary widely. See
H. TURNBULL, LEGAL ASPECTS OF EDUCATING THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED 7 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as TURNBULL]; Kirp, Buss & Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education:
Empirical Studies and Procedural Reforms, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 41 (1974) (estimates of
number of handicapped students vary between 8-35% of school population). The disparity in
the estimates of the number of handicapped children results from the lack of consensus on
the definitions of various handicaps and the variety of potentially handicapping conditions.
See TURNBULL, supra, at 8; 121 CONG. REC. 25531 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie) (learning
disabilities often undefinable). Recent calculations estimate the number of students needing
special education at approximately eight million. See HUMAN ADVOCACY AND P.L. 94-142;
THE EDUCATOR'S ROLE VII (L. Buscaglia & E. Williams eds. 1979).
2 See Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped Children: A Primer for
the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1016, 1018 (1976) (handicapped historically feared and
abused) [hereinafter cited as Krass]. See generally S. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 1-14 (1971) (tracing unequal treatment of handicapped).
I See Pittenger & Kuriloff, Educating the Handicapped: Reforming A Radical Law,
66 THE PUB. INTEREST 72, 73-74 (1982) (handicapped civil rights movement began during
1960's) [hereinafter cited as Pittenger & Kuriloff]. State statutes have prevented the men-
tally handicapped from exercising many basic civil rights. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 43
(1958) (denying mentally handicapped right to make contracts); COLO. REV. STATS. ANN. §
71-1-21 (1973) (same); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 48-104 (1947) (forbidding marriage of mentally
ill); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4507.08(B), (C) (Page 1973) (denying driver's license to mentally
handicapped). See generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 1, at 861-63. Architectural
barriers have prevented the physically handicapped from utilizing modern transportation
facilities. See id. at 866-(physically handicapped often unable to use public transportation).
Some city ordinances forbade the deformed from even appearing in public. See, e.g.,
CHICAGO ILL. MUN. CODE § 36-34 (1966) (repealed 1974) (fining "unsightly" for appearing in
public); COLUMBUS, OHIO GEN. OFFENSE CODE § 2387.04 (1972) (same). One commentator con-
siders the physically handicapped America's most oppressed minority. Sorkin, Equal Ac-
cess to Equal Justice: A Civil Right for the Physically Handicapped, CASE & COMMENT Vo1.
78, No. 2 (1973). See generally Note, Abroad in the Land. Legal Strategies to Effectuate the
Rights of the Physically Disabled, 61 GEO. L.J. 1501, 1509 (1973).
See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 1, at 870-76 (tracing history of education of
handicapped).
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education is essential to the achievement of the personal potential of the
handicapped, 5 those afflicted with mental disabilities were denied access
to the public schools.8 Early special education7 programs for the handi-
capped often merely amounted to removing handicapped children from
the regular classroom and placing them in ineffective and poorly financed
programs.8 With the emergence of the civil rights movement seeking
equal opportunity for all citizens, the handicapped began to demand
proper treatment from society in general and from the education system
in particular.' Federal statutes now encourage appropriate public educa-
tion for the handicapped. 0 Problems continue, however, in integrating
handicapped children into the education system as some areas of school
policy, such as student discipline, remain unclear in relation to the handi-
capped."
Although the Supreme Court has noted the importance of
education," the Court has not recognized any constitutional right to
education. 3 The Supreme Court, however, has required states to provide
' See Blakely, Judical and Legislative Attitudes Toward the Right to an Equal
Education for the Handicapped, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 603, 607 (1979) (mentally handicapped often
need special training to become productive citizens).
' See, e.g., Beattie v. Board of Educ., 169 Wis. 231, -, 172 N.W.2d 153, 154-55
(1919) (excluding child with cerebral palsy from school); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3208 (Supp. 1974)
(excluding those "unable to profit" from education); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115-116 (1975) (same).
' Under § 1401(16) of the EHA, special education consists of designing school pro-
grams to meet the unique needs of the individual child. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976).
Special education programs began around the beginning of the 20th century. See Record at
10, Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257
(E.D. Pa. 1971) (testimony of expert, Ignacy Goldberg) (tracing early history of special
education). By 1974, approximately one-half of the handicapped students were receiving
special education. See Marcroff, Hopes Rises on Education of Handicapped Students, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
' See Pechter, ExceptionalLaw orLaw With Exceptions, 4 AMicus 68,68 (1979) (handi-
capped children were often "dumped" in ineffectual programs).
' See Pittenger & Kuriloff, supra note 3, at 73-74 (handicapped began demanding
equal treatment during civil rights movements of 1960's).
" See Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)) (Educa-
tion For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975); text accompanying notes 38-81 infra
(federal statutes on education of handicapped).
" See text accompanying notes 84-120 infra (problems in disciplining handicapped
children).
" See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975) (right to education property in-
terest protectable by courts); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (education
essential to child's later success); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) (education of
"supreme importance").
" See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (education
not fundamental right created by Constitution). Although the Rodriguez Court found educa-
tion was not a basic right guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court failed to decide
whether some minimal level of education was essential to the exercise of other civil rights.
See id. at 37 (some education necessary to meaningful exercise of right to vote). Arguably,
the complete exclusion of handicapped children from public education would prove un-
constitutional under Rodriguez. See Levin, The Courts, Congress, and Educational Ade-
quacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39 MD. L. REV. 187, 217 (1979) (total educational
exclusion of handicapped children might violate 14th amendment under Rodriguez).
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education, if offered to any students, on an equal basis to all children.14
During the early 1970's, parents of handicapped children began challeng-
ing the denial of equal educational opportunity to the disabled.15 In Penn-
sylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. Pennsylvania,"8
parents of mentally retarded children filed a class action alleging that
state education statutes 7 denied mentally handicapped students equal
protection of the law.'8 The statutes labeled mentally retarded children
"uneducable" and, thus, excluded those students from public schools."
The PARC plaintiffs also alleged that the state denied mentally handi-
capped children due process of the law by concluding that the children
were uneducable without providing the children proper notice or oppor-
tunity to be heard." Fearing the ramifications of a full constitutional
decision and possible damage suits,2 ' all but one. of the PARC defendants
entered into a consent decree that embodied the major demands of the
plaintiffs.' When the non-consenting defendant in PARC later sought an
injunction challenging the federal court's jurisdiction, the court found
sufficient constitutional claims to support a federal cause of action.' The
PARC court recognized that due process arguably requires a proper
hearing before a state can exclude a mentally handicapped child from
public schools. ' Furthermore, the court questioned whether the state
" See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (requiring equal educational
opportunity if states offer public schooling). The Brown decision ruled racial segregation in
public education unconstitutional but did not address specifically the rights of the handicap-
ped. Id. Subsequent to Brown, some courts construed the decision to apply to handicapped
children. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972) (Brown requires
equal education for handicapped); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children (PARC) v.
Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 296-97 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (same).
M See text accompanying notes 16-35 infra (early cases seeking equal education for
mentally handicapped).
,S 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 13-1330, 1375 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79) (excluding
"uneducable" from public education). The statutes challenged in PARC specifically excluded
any person who had not reached a mental age of five years from attending public schools. Id.
§ 1304.
,s PARC v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257, 1258 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment provides in part, "[n]o state shall ... deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
" See note 17 supra (state education statutes at issue in PARC).
334 F. Supp. at 1258.
21 See Note, The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975: In Need of An
Advocate, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 312, 314 (1980) (PARC defendants capitulated to avoid full
litigation and potential damage suits) [hereinafter cited as Advocate].
2 334 F. Supp. at 1248-69 (consent decree). The PARC consent decree required the
state to place each mentally handicapped child in a free educational program designed to
meet the individual student's needs. Id. at 1260. The PARC court mandated full due process
hearings before special hearing officers preceding the educational placement of any mentally
retarded child. Id. at 1266.
23 343 F. Supp. 279, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1972), modifying, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(acknowledging constitutional claims of PARC plaintiffs).
" Id. at 293-95; see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (due process
requires hearing before posting of drunkard's name at liquor store).
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had a rational basis for providing education to some children while deny-
ing the opportunity to the mentally handicapped, thereby positing an
arguable equal protection claim.2" The court thus enjoined the state from
continuing to exclude mentally retarded children from public
education."
Soon after the PARC decision, a District of Columbia action
presented an opportunity for the further litigation of the constitutional
issues regarding the exclusion of the mentally handicapped from public
education. In Mills v. Board of Education,27 the plaintiff-students sought
a declaration of their educational rights and an injunction compelling the
defendant school system to provide appropriate programs for mentally
handicapped children.2" The Mills court granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment after finding that a District of Columbia statute re-
quiring school attendance 29 presupposed equal educational opportunities
for all pupils regardless- of any handicaps." The Mills opinion held that
the equal protection aspects of the fifth amendment, applicable to the
federally controlled District of Columbia, require that all students
receive a publicly supported education if the government undertakes the
343 F. Supp. at 297. The Supreme Court has recognized two basic standards for
evaluating equal protection claims. If a governmental classification relies on suspect
criteria, such as race, or infringes on fundamental liberties, the case deserves strict judicial
scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Under strict
scrutiny, the government must show that a compelling state interest demands the suspect
classification and that no alternative means exist that adequately reach the desired goal.
See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S.
621, 627 (1969); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). Classifications receiving
strict scrutiny seldom meet judicial approval. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944) (racial classifications allowed only for urgent national concerns). Arguably, the
handicapped meet the Supreme Court's definition of a suspect class. See San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (suspect class burdened by disabilities,
history of unequal treatment, or political powerlessness). One state supreme court
specifically has found the handicapped to be a suspect class. In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441,
446-47 (N.D. 1974).
If a governmental classification does not burden a suspect class or infringe on a fun-
damental liberty, the courts only will require that the challenged classification bear a "ra-
tional relation" to a legitimate goal. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
Government actions will pass the rational relation test if any possible justification exists for
the challenged classification. Id. at 426.
21 343 F. Supp. at 302-03; see note 93 infra (requirements for preliminary injunction).
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
Id. at 868.
29 D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 31-201 to -203 (1981). The District of Columbia school laws excluded
from the public schools those handicapped children unable to profit from attendance unless
the child could benefit from an individualized program of special education. Id. Prior to the
Mills decision, the District of Columbia excluded many handicapped children from public
schools because of an insufficient number of special education classes. See Miller & Miller,
The Handicapped Child's Civil Right as it Relates to the "Least Restrictive Environment"
and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1, 12 n.36 (1978) (background to Mills)
[hereinafter cited as Miller & Miller].
so 348 F. Supp. at 874.
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education of any child." Moreover, the district court recognized that due
process requires that a full and fair hearing precede exclusion from or
placement in a special education program22 The Mills court also noted
that the District of Columbia Board of Education had violated the ap-
plicable state statutes and the Board's own regulations by failing to pro-
vide specialized education for handicapped students.3 The court noted
that the high cost of special education did not absolve the government of
its responsibility to educate handicapped children or affect the plaintiff-
students' constitutional rights. 4 In addition, the Mills court expressed a
preference for educating handicapped children within the regular
classroom whenever practicable. 5
The impact of the Mills and PARC decisions accelerated the trend of
increasing federal involvement in the special education field. Although
the federal government traditionally has viewed education as a matter.
for state and local control, 7 Congress has enacted a number of statutes
involving the federal government in local special education programs.
3 8
In 1965, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act39
that announced a commitment to aid in the establishment of programs
1 ,, Id. at 875; see text accompanying note 27 supra (equal protection as applied to
PARC).
= 348 F. Supp. at 875.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 876. Congress has estimated that the education of a handicapped child costs
approximately twice the amount expended on a non-handicapped child. See S. REP. No. 168,
168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1425, 1439
(relative costs of special education).
1 348 F. Supp. at 880. The practice of educating handicapped children within the
regular classroom is known as "mainstreaming." Advocate, supra note 21, at 324. In-
tegrating the handicapped child into the regular classroom is considered important to the
social and educational development of handicapped children. See Note, The Education For
All Handicapped Children Act Opening the Schoolhouse Door, 6 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CH.
43, 51 (1976) (importance of mainstreaming) [hereinafter cited as Opening the Schoolhouse
Door].
I See Miller & Miller, supra note 29, at 14 (PARC and Mills led to increased federal
involvement in special education). Congress read the Mills and PARC decisions as recogniz-
ing a constitutional right to equal educational opportunity for the handicapped. See Act of
Nov. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(b)(9), 89 Stat. 775 ("Statement of Findings and
Purpose") (equal protection demands federal assistance to special education); Comment, The
Least Restrictive Environment Section of the Education for All Handicapped Children Act
of 1975: A Legislative History and an Analysis, 13 GONZ. L. REV. 717, 751 (1978) (Congress
believed PARC and Mills required equal education for handicapped) [hereinafter cited as
Least Restrictive Environment].
I See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (education a local concern); Note,
Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The Education For All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1103, 1109 (1979) (education properly a local concern)
[hereinafter cited as Enforcing the Right]. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213
(1972) (education primary state function).
' See text accompanying notes 39-70 infra (evolution of federal law).
" Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1965)).
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for handicapped children deprived of an appropriate education. 40 The ad-
dition of Title VI to the Act in 196641 guaranteed federal assistance to
the states in the development of programs for handicapped children.2 A
separate Education of Handicapped Children Act,4 3 enacted in 1970,
replaced previous federal law in the special education field. The evolu-
tion of federal law on the education of the handicapped continued with
the Education of the Handicapped Amendments of 1974" and culminated
in the Education For All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EHA)."5 The
EHA announced a national policy seeking an appropriate education for
all handicapped children.0
Under the EHA, Congress provides funds to subsidize special educa-
tion in states meeting qualification requirements. 4' To qualify for funding
under the EHA, a state must show that it maintains a policy of providing
a free and appropriate public education to all handicapped children 4 and
a comprehensive plan for the implementation of the policies that the
EHA embodies. 49 The state plans must detail procedures to assure that
handicapped children are, to the maximum extent practicable, educated
" Id. § 201 ("Declaration of Policy").
" Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 161, 80 Stat. 1204 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1213 (1966)
(amending P.L. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965)).
42 Id.
" Pub. L. No. 91-230, §§ 601-662, 84 Stat. 175-88 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(1970) (amending P. L. No. 89-750, 80 Stat. 1204 (1966)). The Education of Handicapped
Children Act concentrated on the training of special education personnel and acquisition of
proper resources. Id.
" Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 611-621, 88 Stat. 579-585 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461
(Supp. 1975) (amending 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970)). Congress perceived the Education of
the Handicapped Amendments of 1974 (EHA of 1974) as a temporary measure to subsidize
special education until passage of more comprehensive legislation. See 120 Cong. Rec.
15,269, 15,270, 15,273, 15,276 (1974) (remarks of Sens. Mathias, Williams, Humphrey, & Ken-
nedy respectively) (EHA of 1974 needed until passage of stronger bill); Pittenger & Kuriloff,
supra note 3, at 82 (EHA of 1974 stop-gap measure). The EHA of 1974 provided state educa-
tion systems grants of $8.75 for each student enrolled in handicapped education programs.
20 U.S.C. § 1411 (effective through September 30, 1977). The Education of the Handicapped
Amendments mandated basic due process protections in connection with special education
placements. Id. § 1413(13) (effective through September 30, 1977). See generally Least
Restrictive Environment, supra note 36 at 763-68 (legislative history of EHA of 1974).
" Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)). See
generally Least Restrictive Environment supra note 36, at 724-63 (legislative history of
P.L. 94-142).
"8 Act of Nov. 29, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142 § 3(c), 89 Stat. 775 ("Statement of Findings
and Purpose") (national policy to provide appropriate education to handicapped).
7 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (1976). States qualifying under the EHA receive a percentage of
the average cost of educating a handicapped child multiplied by the number of children
enrolled in special education programs in the state. Id. States may receive funds to supple-
ment the educational costs of up to 12% of the school population. Id. § 1411(a)(5)(A)(1). State
education systems must expend 25% of the federal funds received to provide direct services
to handicapped students and to develop personal and other resources. Id. § 1411(c)(2)(A)(ii).
Local education agencies receive the remainder of the funds allocated under the EHA. Id. §
1411(d).




with non-handicapped children." To receive EHA funding, the state also
must demonstrate that, as part of the state education plan, testing and
placement procedures are not racially or culturally biased. 1 Once iden-
tified, a handicapped child must receive an individualized education pro-
gram (IEP) prepared after consultation between school officials and the
affected child's parents.52 Special education teachers review and revise
each student's IEP annually."
After state and local education agencies qualify for funding under
the EHA, the Act requires that the agencies adopt procedural
safeguards to protect the rights of handicapped children and their
parents." Parents may examine all relevant records5 and can obtain an
independent evaluation of their child's educational needs. 6 Moreover,
w Id. § 1412(5)(B). Mainstreaming handicapped and non-handicapped children in the
same classroom has significant benefits for the children involved. See NATIONAL ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON EDUCATION PROFESSIONS DEVELOPMENT, MAINSTREAMING: HELPING TEACHERS
MEET THE CHALLENGE 18-19 (1976) (mainstreaming sensitizes non-handicapped children to
plight of handicapped students); note 35 supra (benefits of mainstreaming to handicapped
students). Mainstreamifig handicapped children may impose significant burdens on non-
specialist teachers, however. See Opening the Schoolhouse Door, supra note 35, at 53
(teachers unprepared to deal with handicapped children).
51 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C) (1976). Observers have noted that biased evaluation pro-
cedures often misclassify males and minority students as mentally handicapped. Kirp, Buss
& Kuriloff, Legal Reform of Special Education: Empirical Studies and Procedural Pro-
posals, 62 CAL. L. REV. 40, 44, 50 (1974). Misclassification can have serious consequences for
the child denied or unnecessarily placed in special education. See Note, Legal Remedies for
the Misclassification or Wrongful Placement of Educationally Handicapped Children, 14
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. CH. 389, 398-401 (1979) (misclassification may lead to stigmatization, poor
academic performance, and diminished future earning capability) [hereinafter cited as
Misclassification]. In order to avoid misclassification the EHA forbids the use of any single
evaluation device as the sole criterion for educational placement. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(C)
(1976); see Larry P. v. Riles, 343 F. Supp. 1306, 1313-14 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 502 F.2d 963
(9th Cir. 1974) (sole use of IQ test for special education placement racially discriminatory).
- 20 U.S.C. § 1412(4) (1976). The individualized education program (IEP) must detail
the child's current development, appropriate classroom placement, short and long term
educational goals, as well as appropriate means for evaluating the child's progress. 34
C.F.R. § 300.346 (1981). Teachers prepare IEP's after consultation between school represen-
tatives, the parents of the handicapped child, and, if appropriate, the child involved. Id.
§ 300.344. Despite the ability to participate in planning decisions, parents of handicapped
children often cannot provide meaningful input because of lack of expertise or deference to
professional educators. See Enforcing the Right supra note 37, at 1111. Teachers are not
liable for a child's failure to reach IEP goals. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.349 (1981) (IEP guidelines).
The IEP requirement recognizes the unique needs of each handicapped child although add-
ing an onerous burden of paperwork on individual teachers. See Pittenger & Kuriloff, supra
note 3, at 94-95 (problems created by IEP's).
20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(5) (1976).
Id. § 1415.
Id. § 1415(b)(1)(A). If the parents of a handicapped child are unknown or the child is a
ward of the state, an independent surrogate represents the child's interests. Id. §
1415(b)(1)(B).
"Id. § 1415(b)(1)(A). Parents seeking an independent educational evaluation of their
children must bear the costs of the evaluation if a subsequent due process hearing finds the
original evaluation appropriate. 34 C.F.R. § 300.503(b) (1981).
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parents or guardians of handicapped children must receive prior written
notice wheneVer an educational agency proposes or refuses to change
the evaluation or placement of a child.57 In addition, an impartial due pro-
cess hearing before an independent hearing officer follows any complaint
alleging a violation of the provisions of the EHA.58 At any hearing con-
ducted pursuant to the EHA, parties receive the right to advice of
counsel and educational specialists, the right to present evidence, and
the right to cross-examine and compel the attendence of witnesses. 9 The
education hearing is conducted on the record, thus providing a
transcript if the case is appealed to a reviewing body."0
Any party aggrieved by the outcome of a local hearing may appeal to
the state education agency for a review of the decision." The state
review examines the local hearing record and procedural history and
may receive additional evidence or argument." The hearing officer con-
ducting the state review makes an independent decision, unaffected by
the rulings of the local hearing." The decision at the state level is final
unless a party to the controversy appeals the case for judicial considera-
tion.64
Any aggrieved party may bring a civil action challenging the findings
of the hearings conducted at the state or local level.5 State and federal
courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear complaints under the EHA.66
The EHA empowers courts to grant full de novo review of educational
hearings and decide the merits of the case by a preponderance of the
5, 20 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1)(C) (1976).
5 Id. § 1415(a)(2). The officer conducting the hearing must not be an employee of the
educational unit responsible for the education of the child. Id.
11 Id. § 1415(d); see Eberle v. Board of Pub. Educ. of School Dist., 444 F. Supp. 41, 43
(D. Pa. 1977), affd, 582 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978) (states may utilize more rigorous due process
procedures than required by EHA).
- 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d)(3) (1976); see text accompanying notes 61-70 infra (EHA appeals
procedures). Although the EHA specifically does not allocate the burden of persuasion,
policy considerations recognizing the relative expertise and resources of the parties favor
placing the burden on the school authorities. See Misclassification, supra note 51, at 422-28
(suggested burden of proof at local education hearings).
61 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976).
62 Id.; 34 C.F.R. § 300.510 (1981). See Enforcing the Right, supra note 37, at 1107 (state
should give full de novo review of local proceedings). State review, away from local
pressures, may result in fairer results than the local due process hearing. See Diamond,
Survey of New York Education Law 1977, 29 SYRACUSE L. REV. 103, 144 (1978) (state review
more objective and knowledgeable).
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976).
Id. § 1415(e)(1).
65 Id. § 1415(e).
Id. § 1415(e)(2). Some commentators feel that the grant of concurrent jurisdiction
under the EHA encourages forum shopping by parties seeking the court most amenable to




evidence."' No changes in a child's educational placement may occur dur-
ing the pendency of any proceedings authorized by the EHA unless all
parties involved acquiesce. 8 If a handicapped child seeks initial admis-
sion to a public school, the child shall, with parental consent, be placed in
the regular program during the pendency of any EHA proceedings. 9
Courts have required parents to exhaust the preliminary administrative
remedies prior to bringing a judicial action under the EHA. 0
Other federal laws also protect the rights of handicapped children.
Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 794),1 prohibits
discrimination against any otherwise qualified individual in connection
with any program receiving federal funding, if the discrimination results
solely from the individual's handicap. 2 In view of the pervasiveness of
federal aid to education, section 794 reaches every public school system
in the United States."3 Although the Supreme Court has limited the ap-
plication of section 794 to instances in which the handicapped individual
is fully capable of functioning in the program in spite of the handicap, 4
the section supplements the protections that the EHA provides. 5 While
87 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976); see S. REP. No. 455, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 47-50 (1975),
reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1480, 1480, 1500-02 (rejecting limited
judicial review of hearings under the EHA).
" 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976). One observer believes that some parents intentionally
delay EHA proceedings in order to postpone changes in their children's educational place-
ment. See Jacobs, Hidden Damages, Hidden Costs, 4 AMicus 86, 87 (1979).
69 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1976).
7' E.g., H. R. v. Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Md. 1981); Monahan v. Nebraska,
491 F. Supp. 1074, 1086 (D. Neb. 1980). Plaintiffs may bring civil actions under the EHA
without pursuing local or state hearings if the hearings would prove ineffectual. See H.R. v.
Hornbeck, 524 F. Supp. 215, 218 (D. Md. 1981) (parents need not pursue futile administrative
remedies); Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dept., 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (W.D.N.Y. 1979)
(biased hearing officers render administrative remedies futile).
71 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1979).
1 Id. The Rehabilitation Act is modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
which forbids racial discrimination by any program receiving federal assistance. Baugh, The
Federal Legislation On Equal Educational Opportunity For The Handicapped, 15 IDAHO L.
REV. 65, 74 (1978) (§ 794 extends civil rights protection to handicapped) [hereinafter cited as
Baugh]; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1976) (forbidding racial discrimination in federally funded
programs).
" Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 989 (E.D. Pa. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 923 (1981) (§ 794 applies to local school districts); see Baugh,
supra note 72, at 73 (§ 794 reaches every school district).
7' Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1979). In Davis, the
Supreme Court upheld the denial of admission of a hearing impaired woman to a federally
subsidized nurse training program. Id. at 400-01. The Davis Court ruled that § 794 does not
require any substantial modification of standards solely to benefit handicapped individuals.
Id. at 413. The Court interpreted § 794 only to prohibit discrimination based solely on irra-
tional prejudice against the handicapped. Id. at 405.
" See Riley v. Ambach, 508 F. Supp. 1222, 1227 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (EHA and § 794 have
same features and goals in connection with public education of handicapped children).
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section 794 does not grant specifically a private right of action, a number
of federal courts have implied such a cause of action. 6
Parents alleging improper education of their handicapped children
also may bring suit under section 1983 of the federal civil rights
statutes." Since section 1983 is a purely remedial statute, conferring no
independent rights, 8 plaintiffs must allege a violation of a specific
federal right in order to bring a general civil rights action. Although the
courts remain divided on the necessity of exhausting administrative
remedies prior to the initiation of a section 1983 action, 9 one federal
court has ruled that a plaintiff seeking redress of a violation of the EHA
could bring a civil rights action without appealing a local hearing deci-
sion to state authorities." Nevertheless, school districts may be immune
from liability under federal civil rights legislation thus limiting the
availability of section 1983 relief to parents alleging a denial of equal
educational opportunity to handicapped children.'
In response to the growing awareness of the educational needs of
handicapped children, the federal government has attempted to enact
comprehensive legislation to ensure appropriate education for disabled
students." Many areas of special education law remain unsettled,
however, because of the vagueness of the EHA and the absence of ap-
plicable case law. 3 The ability of school authorities to suspend or expel
,' See, e.g., Adashunas v. Negley, 626 F.2d 600, 603 (7th Cir. 1980); United Handicap-
ped Federation v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977); Kampmeir v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d
296, 299 (2d Cir. 1977). But see Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 462 F. Supp.
424, 426 (E.D. Va. 1977) (mem.), aff'd, 590 F.2d 87 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947
(1979) (no congressional intent to grant private right of action against private employer).
See also Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (test for implying private right of action).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (authorizing civil actions against any person denying civil
rights of another under color of state law).
" See McGowen v. Hahn, No. 78-C-4233 (N.D. Ill. July 27, 1981) (§ 1983 purely remedial
statute).
" Compare Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 634 F.2d 900, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1981) (court may
require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to § 1983 action) and Adams v. City of
Chicago, 491 F. Supp. 1257, 1260 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (same) with Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.
Supp. 946, 957 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (plaintiff need not exhaust administrative remedies prior to
§ 1983 action).
I Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F. Supp. 946, 956 (E.D. Pa. 1975). In Fialkowski, plaintiffs
parents did not appeal a local hearing board decision to the state education authorities
before bringing a civil action under the EHA. Id.
See Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699, 702 (6th Cir.
1976) (school district not "person" liable under § 1983); Mims v. Board of Educ., 523 F.2d 711,
716 (7th Cir. 1975) (same); Huntley v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016, 1017
n.2 (4th Cir. 1974) (same). But see Keckeisen v. Independent School Dist., 509 F.2d 1062,
1064 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975) (school district "person" liable under § 1983).
82 See text accompanying notes 38-76 supra (federal law on education of handicapped
children).
3 See Comment, Self-Sufficiency Under the Education For All Handicapped Children




handicapped children is unclear. Courts generally consider school
disciplinary matters to be within the discretion and control of state and
local authorities. 4 The Supreme Court has reviewed some instances of
suspension and expulsion as a means of school discipline.85 In Goss v.
Lopez," the Supreme Court ruled that a child's property right to educa-
tion demands a proper due process hearing before a student could face
suspension for ten days or more. 7 The discipline of handicapped
children, however, involves more complex issues than those that are pre-
sent in the suspension or expulsion of nonhandicapped children.
Disruptive behavior by handicapped school children may result from
a number of sources. Behavior problems may arise directly from the
nature of the child's handicap or from misclassification or inappropriate
education.' Thus, the interrelation of a child's handicap and disruptive
behavior leading to suspension or expulsion is seldom clear or easily
determined by a court.
The first case discussing the expulsion of a child protected under the
EHA arose in the federal district court for Connecticut. In Stuart v.
Nappi,0 an emotionally disturbed student was suspended for ten days
and faced a disciplinary hearing for expulsion resulting from her par-
ticipation in a school-wide riot. The plaintiff child received the suspen-
sion following regular disciplinary procedures. 2 The Nappi court ruled
that the plaintiff had shown potential irreparable injury resulting from
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (school disciplinary rules state concern);
Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1243 (D. Conn. 1978) (school discipline within discretion
of local authorities).
' E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1974) (requiring due process in suspension
proceedings); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969) (suspension of
students for wearing armbands violated right to free speech); Board of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1942) (enjoining expulsion of students for not saluting flag).
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
", Id. at 584. School systems need not provide full due process hearings for students
suspended less than 10 days because an informal meeting between the parties is sufficient
to protect the students' rights. See Reineman v. Valley View Community School IDist., No.
81-C-2053 (E.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1981) (informal meeting constitutes sufficient hearing prior to
short suspension of student).
U See Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 228 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (school cannot expel child
for behavior related to handicap); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (D. Conn. 1978)
(misbehavior may result from inappropriate education of handicapped student); Frederick L.
v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same).
" See Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (D. Conn. 1978) (no reported decisions
discussing expulsion of handicapped child); text accompanying notes 90-104 infra (discussion
of Nappi).
" 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn. 1978).
" Id. at 1239. The defendant school system in Nappi had diagnosed the plaintiff child
as in need of special education. Id. After the Nappi plaintiff ceased attending the special
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the possible expulsion.93 In addition, the court found that the plaintiffs
had demonstrated probable success on alleged violations of four federally
created rights under the EHA.94 Specifically, the Nappi court found
potential violations of the EHA in that the suspension of the student
would deny her the right to an appropriate education95 and the right to
maintain her current educational status until resolution of her complaint
under the EHA." In addition, the court found a violation of the plaintiffs
right to an education in the least restrictive environment9" and her right
to have any changes in placement follow statutory procedures.9"
In reviewing the Nappi controversy, the court noted the inherent
ambiguity of the sparse federal regulation of disciplinary proceedings in-
volving handicapped children. 9  A comment to the regulations enacted
pursuant to the EHA states that while a handicapped child's educational
placement may not be changed without following the strictures of the
EHA, a school may utilize normal procedures for disciplining students
dangerous to themselves or others. ' A later comment on the regula-
tions suggests that the EHA limits the ability of school systems to ex-
clude disruptive handicapped children to emergency situations.0 ' The
Nappi court concluded that neither the EHA nor the applicable regula-
tions permitted the expulsion of a handicapped student during the
pendency of a complaint under the EHA.1°2 Therefore, the court granted
" Id. at 1240. In order to receive a preliminary injunction, the Nappi court required
that the plaintiff show the possibility of irreparable harm to the child and a demonstration
of probable success on the merits of the case. Id.; see Triebwasser & Katz v. AT&T, 535
F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976) (requirements for preliminary injunction); Hartford v. Hicks,
408 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D. Conn. 1975) (same). The Nappi court found that irreparable injury
to the plaintiff could result from the delay in developing a special education program for the
plaintiff after her expulsion. 443 F. Supp. at 1240. The court found that irreparable harm to
the plaintiff also could result from the denial of special education in public schools since the
plaintiff would have to seek instruction from a private school or home tutor. Id.
443 F. Supp. at 1240.
5 Id. at 1240; see 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1), (15-(19) (1976) (handicapped child must receive ap-
propriate public education). The Nappi court believed that the school had violated the plain-
tiffs right to an appropriate education by denying her a program designed to meet her
educational needs. 443 F. Supp. at 1241. The violation of the right to an appropriate educa-
tion did not involve the proposed expulsion of the student. Id.
" 443 F. Supp. at 1240; see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) (1976) (child must remain in current
placement until educational complaint settled).
1 443 F. Supp. at 1240. The Nappi court ruled that the EHA requires a change in
placement to a more controlled environment, rather than expulsion from school. Id. at 1243.
The regulations promulgated under the EHA require schools to provide a continuum of in-
creasingly restrictive placements so that handicapped students will receive a proper educa-
tion rather than being denied all education. See 34 C.F.R. 300.551 (1981) (requiring con-
tinuum of alternative placements.
443 F. Supp. at 1240.
" Id. at 1242.
,0 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 (comment) (1981).
101 Id.
"1 443 F. Supp. at 1242.
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a preliminary injunction preventing a disciplinary hearing concerning
the possible expulsion of the student.' °3 The Nappi court tempered its
decision by acknowledging that handicapped students could face short
suspensions without receiving due process hearings and that proper
placement committees could recommend a restrictive educational en-
vironment for handicapped students with behavioral problems.'
Until 1981, no federal appeals court offered guidance on proper
disciplinary procedures for handicapped children.'0 5 In S-1 v.
Turlington,"' the Fifth Circuit considered the expulsion of seven mentally
handicapped children from a Florida high school."" Six of the students
neither requested nor received hearings concerning any possible correla-
tion between their handicaps and their misbehavior.'0 ' The seventh stu-
dent did not receive a hearing because the local superintendent of
schools felt that the absence of serious emotional disturbance in the stu-
dent precluded any finding that the alleged misconduct stemmed from
the student's handicap."'
In affirming the issuance of an injunction, the Fifth Circuit held that
an expulsion amounted to a change in educational placement invoking
the protections of the EHA."' The Turlington court reasoned that since
expulsion represents a change in placement, only a duly qualified and
knowledgeable panel properly could initiate such a change in
placement."' The court held, therefore, that before an expulsion could oc-
cur, the evaluation panel must determine whether the disruptive
behavior resulted from the child's handicap."' The Turlington decision
acknowledged, however, that expulsion of a handicapped child was per-
missible in some circumstances."' The court concluded that for an expul-
"7Id. at 1244.
"0 Id. at 1243.
10 See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 345 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 566 (1981)
(no appellate decisions considering expulsion of handicapped children).
' 635 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1981).
"7 Id. at 343-44. The offenses causing the expulsions in Turlington ranged from various
sexual acts to defiance of authorities, insubordination, vandalism, and profanity. Id. at 344
n.1.
log Id. at 344.
'0 Id. Two other students joined the Turlington action, claiming their exclusion from
special education programs constituted a denial of statutory rights. Id. The two students
joining the Turlington action were not facing disciplinary proceedings, but rather were
challenging the denial of an appropriate education. Id.
0 Id. at 347-48; see Sherry v. New York State Educ. Dept., 479 F. Supp. 1328, 1337
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (suspension of handicapped student due to lack of adequate supervision
equals change in placement); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (D. Conn. 1978) (expul-
sion equals change in placement invoking EHA); 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(a)(3) (1981) (proper
placement panel must make all placement decisions).
"1 635 F.2d 347; see 34 C.F.R. § 300.533(a)(3) (1981) (placement decisions under EHA
must be made by group knowledgeable about child, meaning of evaluation, and available op-
tions).
' 635 F.2d at 348, citing, Doe v. Koger, 480 F. Supp. 225, 229 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
" 635 F.2d at 348.
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sion decision to satisfy the Turlington guidelines, school districts must
follow proper EHA procedures, and the expelled child must not be
denied all educational services during the expulsion period.'
The limited case law concerning the expulsion of handicapped
children illustrates the practical difficulties of applying the provisions of
the EHA. The EHA requires numerous hearings that will increase the
costs of an already overburdened education system."' The hearings
could result in many judicial appeals, causing both delay of necessary
special education changes and further involvement of the federal
judiciary in local education. On a broader level, the hearing re-
quirements of the EHA may introduce a disruptive measure of adver-
sariness to the field of education."' Consequently, the possibility of
judicial scrutiny of educational decisions may stifle innovation on the
part of school officials."7 The preferential treatment afforded handicap-
ped children in expulsion proceedings may have other detrimental ef-
fects. Special treatment of the handicapped may lead to a general at-
titude of disrespect for school disciplinary processes."8 One commen-
tator has hypothesized that nonhandicapped students may claim
disabilities in order to obtain a limited immunity from expulsion."'
Hopefully, as schools become more familiar with the difficulties atten-
.dant to the education of the handicapped, school authorities will develop
procedures for maintaining order within the strictures of the law. The
future of educational rights for the handicapped, however, is not
altogether clear.'
The passage of the EHA marked a great step forward in the strug-
gle for equal educational rights for handicapped children. The provision
of a free public education for handicapped children is costly, 2' and Con-
gress has refused to appropriate the full measure of funds called for by
the EHA.' If the federal government ceases to subsidize special educa-
tion costs, the parents of handicapped children may have to pursue the
constitutional remedies first enunciated during the early 1970's.'3
American society has recognized its obligation to train and educate handi-
Id.
"' See Pittenger & Kuriloff, supra note 3, at 86-89 (costs under EHA potentially stag-
gering).
"' See id. at 90.
'" See id.
118 See Enforcing the Right, supra note 37, at 1107 n.33.
119 Id.
" See text accompanying notes 121-23 infra.
121 See note 3 supra note 3, at 87 (Congress has not appropriated sufficient funds for
EHA program). Of the three and one-half billion dollars authorized by the EHA for fiscal
year 1982, Congress only appropriated 874 million dollars. Id.
" See Pittenger & Kuriloff, supra note 3, at 87 (Congress has not appropriated suffi-
cient funds for EHA program). Of the three and one-half billion dollars authorized by the
EHA for fiscal year 1982, Congress only appropriated 874 million dollars. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 16-35 supra (Mills and PARC decisions).
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capped children, but courts must still determine the parameters of
educational rights and the sources of necessary funding. The judicial
system and the education establishment must assist the parents of handi-
capped children in the struggle for equal education if the progress made
in special education is to continue.
H. DAVID NATKIN

